War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives.

War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. In their monograph, War and Reason: Domestic and InternationalImperatives, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a political scientist, professor at New York University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He specializes in international relations, foreign policy, and nation building. He is also one of the authors of the selectorate theory. and David Lalman offer animpressive analysis of interntional conflict. Those familiar with Buenode Mesquita's earlier work will notice similarities in War andReason.(1) This volume is certainly part of that larger project ofbuilding "an expected utility theory of war," however it is asubstantial improvement over earlier efforts, particularly in itsmodeling of the strategic interaction between countries.The "interaction game" put forward by Bueno de Mesquita Abraham ('Appie') Bueno de Mesquita (Amsterdam, July 23, 1918 — Lelystad, August 19, 2005), commonly known under his stage name Bueno de Mesquita was a Dutch comedian, actor and stage artist, well known for his ability to make funny faces. andLalman is a modification of the now-standard crisis bargaining gamesused by so many in the literature.(2) The game begins with a chance moveto determine which player will be player A and which will be player B,player A having the advantage of moving first. Each player has theopportunity to make at least one demand. The players then have theoption of accepting the status quo [Latin, The existing state of things at any given date.] Status quo ante bellum means the state of things before the war. The status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. or acquiescing to the other playersdemand - in either case ending the game, or making a counter-demand. Ifthe players choose to make counter-demands (i.e., do not accept thestatus quo or acquiesce) then the game moves to a stage in which the useof force is a possibility. If both players choose not to use force, thennegotiations ensue; if one player does not use force in response to theother players use of force, the former player capitulates; and, finally,if both players use force, war ensues. In short, the terminal nodes(possible outcomes) of the game are: (1) both players accepting thestatus quo; (2) one player acquiescing to the other's demand; (3)both players negotiating; (4) one player capitulating to theother's use of force; or (5) war. Obviously, these outcomes varydepending on whether A or B capitulates or strikes first in war.Of course, any model is a simplification of reality, so it isnecessary to make assumptions. But here, as in any model, a few of theassumptions are questionable. The most controversial assumptions arefirst, that the expected gross benefits of negotiating are the same asthose of war, and second, that countries' domestic political costsof initiating the use of force rise with their expected probability ofsuccess in a conflict. The first of these assumptions is troublesomebecause it implies that the net benefits of negotiation are alwayshigher than those of war (since war always involves higher costs thannegotiation). This may not always be the case, particularly when asmall, weaker nation may hope to gain more from war than fromnegotiation, and may be especially true if the resolve of the strongercountry is in question (the Confederacy's attack of Fort Sumter Fort Sumter,fortification, built 1829–60, on a shoal at the entrance to the harbor of Charleston, S.C., and named for Gen. Thomas Sumter; scene of the opening engagement of the Civil War. Upon passing the Ordinance of Secession (Dec. andthe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor,land-locked harbor, on the southern coast of Oahu island, Hawaii, W of Honolulu; one of the largest and best natural harbors in the E Pacific Ocean. In the vicinity are many U.S. military installations, including the chief U.S. come to mind). The second assumptionis even more problematic because it implies that the costs to the morepowerful country might be exorbitant when it is much more powerful thanthe weaker country. The authors claim that "the more powerfulparticipant ... bears a greater burden for finding a peaceful resolutionof differences." Exactly the opposite argument could also be made:Governments of weaker countries bear the heavier domestic political costbecause they were foolish enough to initiate war with a stronger country(the Falklands conflict may be a good example).This criticism of assumptions should not detract from detract fromverb 1. lessen, reduce, diminish, lower, take away from, derogate, devaluate verb 2. a fine piece ofanalysis. All in all, the book offers an example of game theorywell-applied. In addition to the strengths that one can usually expectfrom formal modeling (logical rigor rigor/rig��or/ (rig��er) [L.] chill; rigidity.rigor mor��tis? the stiffening of a dead body accompanying depletion of adenosine triphosphate in the muscle fibers. and clarity of thought andexposition), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman offer something more - theysqueeze every last implication out of their model. By successivelyaltering first one then another assumption (particularly about theplayers' "types" - primarily "doves" and"hawks" - under incomplete information), the authors generatea handful of very useful ceteris paribus Ceteris ParibusLatin phrase that translates approximately to "holding other things constant" and is usually rendered in English as "all other things being equal". In economics and finance, the term is used as a shorthand for indicating the effect of one economic variable on conditions under which war,negotiation or acquiescence will be more likely to occur. The model isalso used to discuss a variety of interesting historical cases(including an entire chapter applying the model to the Seven Weeks War),as well as some enduring theoretical issues in international politics,such as hegemonic stability theory Hegemonic Stability Theory postulates a number of rules for the maintenance and decline of international monetary and political systems. Its leading exponents are the political scientist Stephen D. Krasner and economic historian Charles P. Kindleberger. and the "democratic peace."In the limited space of this review, all the applications cannot beaddressed; readers can judge for themselves whether or not they seemplausible. It is clear, however, that the model's explanatorypotential is impressive.Because it offers so many insights, those interested in policyimplications will not be disappointed with this volume. Indeed, there isan entire chapter devoted to policy implications for the post-cold Warworld. The book shows once again that "there is nothing sopractical as a good theory." Game theory, in particular, has beenmuch maligned ma��lign?tr.v. ma��ligned, ma��lign��ing, ma��lignsTo make evil, harmful, and often untrue statements about; speak evil of.adj.1. Evil in disposition, nature, or intent.2. for being too rarefied rar��e��fiedalso rar��i��fied ?adj.1. Belonging to or reserved for a small select group; esoteric.2. Elevated in character or style; lofty.rarefiedAdjective1. or divorced from reality. This booktacitly responds to that criticism. Each of its conditional predictionsoffers, at the very least, a key for policy makers to better understandstate behavior and perhaps even a first cut at how to alter it and avoidwar. These insights will not come easily to readers who are unfamiliarwith game theory. The logic can at times be involved and the proofssomewhat tedious for the uninitiated, but those with the patience towork through the proofs will be rewarded with some interesting insightsinto international politics.Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman can be commended for applying theirtheory to rigorous tests throughout the book. This type of combinedformal and empirical work is very welcome in political science,specifically in the study of international relations international relations,study of the relations among states and other political and economic units in the international system. Particular areas of study within the field of international relations include diplomacy and diplomatic history, international law, . The tests,unfortunately, are not entirely convincing. Many readers may findquestionable the authors' dependent and independent variables In mathematics, an independent variable is any of the arguments, i.e. "inputs", to a function. These are contrasted with the dependent variable, which is the value, i.e. the "output", of the function. ,which are often constructions from rough proxies (e.g., forcountries' utilities, or the level of uncertainty in'relations between two countries). The problem is not so much that theauthors rely too heavily on proxy variables (which they describe inAppendix 1); if proxies are the only measures available, it is better touse them than to forego rigorous attempts at testing the model. Thelarger problem is that they usually use only bivariate bi��var��i��ate?adj.Mathematics Having two variables: bivariate binomial distribution.Adj. 1. techniques totest their predicted relationships, almost certainly introducing anelement of omitted variable bias into the results. For this reason, theresults must be taken with a grain of salt. For instance, the authorsare quick to dismiss the realpolitik realpolitikPolitics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals. The word does not mean “real” in the English sense but rather connotes “things”—hence a politics of adaptation to things as they are. or realist version of their modelbecause the results of a few bivariate empirical tests in Chapter Threedo not corroborate To support or enhance the believability of a fact or assertion by the presentation of additional information that confirms the truthfulness of the item.The testimony of a witness is corroborated if subsequent evidence, such as a coroner's report or the testimony of other its predictions. But these tests are far too weak andpreliminary to support such conclusions. The tests for the domesticversion of the model suffer from the same shortcoming, often consistingof bivariate logits or crosstabulations, although they are much moresupportive than those of the realpolitik model.Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman do generate many predictions in thisbook, and they test most of them. One might be tempted to conclude thatthere is strength in numbers and accept their overall results. It isdoubtfull, however, that ten biased tests are worth one unbiased test.In fairness, the authors are quite up-front about the limited andpreliminary character of their empirical work in the appendix, but thosereaders who do not reach the appendix may be left with the impressionthat the tests are conclusive. A more serious empirical effort is neededbefore one can fully trust the model.The major question remaining is the role of domestic politics insecurity policy. Explanations of security policy have traditionallyrelied on international systemic ("third-image") explanations,but what is generally overlooked is an inside-out, second-imageexplanation, or the role of domestic policy in creating internationalsecurity policy. In that sense this book is a disappointment. Despiteits subtitle, "Domestic and International Imperatives,"domestic politics are not really addressed.The role of domestic politics offered in this monograph is as avaguely specified, extra constraint - actually an extra cost - thatforeign-policy makers must consider when deciding security policy. Theonly difference in the model between the realpolitik and domesticversions of the game is that, in the former, politicians are lessconstrained, allowing the authors to determine endogenously the demandsthey place on other countries in the international interaction game. Thedomestic version of the game is indistinguishable from any other modelin which policy makers' choices of what demands to make are somehowconstrained or exogenous. In the end, the policy process in this model,whether realpolitik or domestic, is still very much the "blackbox" for which third-image explanations have been criticized in thepast.What is still lacking within the study of security policy is a trueset of micro-foundations: a model based on the incentives of policymakers and domestic constituents as individuals - in which the policymakers set security policy (as they set all policy) with an eye toremaining in office; constituents choose to take costly political action(or not) based on their policy preferences and the costs of collectiveaction; and, finally, there are links between these two sets of actors(be they elections, lobbying or threat of coups) in which theconstituents have some effect on the policy makers' ability toremain in office. This book really offers none of thesemicrofoundations. Perhaps it is too tall an order to hope that it would,but studies of other policy areas have provided these micro-foundations(particularly analyses of trade policy).(3)This shortcoming is perhaps most evident in the book'sdiscussion of the now familiar "democratic peace" puzzle. Theauthors' explanation for the democratic peace is that liberaldemocratic institutions act something like a "poolingmechanism" in a signalling game. In the international interactiongame in this book, it is often the uncertainty about the otherplayer's willingness to resort to war that leads to war in thefirst place, principally by giving countries incentives to attackpreemptively. Since the domestic political costs of going to war inliberal democracies are considerably higher than in non-democracies, theauthors argue, liberal democracies do not expect other liberaldemocracies to resort to war. It is precisely this alteration ofexpectations that reinforces the peace. The incentive to preempt pre��emptor pre-empt ?v. pre��empt��ed, pre��empt��ing, pre��emptsv.tr.1. To appropriate, seize, or take for oneself before others. See Synonyms at appropriate.2. a. ismitigated because each side does not believe the other will attack inthe first place.The difference in expectations as an explanation for the liberalpeace is highly appealing. It explains why, even when liberaldemocracies do find themselves in sharp disagreement, they do not resortto war or, it seems, even consider war as an option. But are the higherdomestic political costs of war among democracies the cause of theseexpectations? It seems implausible. There is no reason a priori a prioriIn epistemology, knowledge that is independent of all particular experiences, as opposed to a posteriori (or empirical) knowledge, which derives from experience. to thinkthat the domestic political costs of war are higher in "freestates" than in non-democracies. Is it really more costly for astable democracy to go to war than a shaky dictatorship? It seems moreplausible that the domestic political costs of initiating war are onlyhigher for democracies against other democracies, but this requires usto resort to ideological factors that formal political scientists areoften wary to invoke. If one is loathe to use these ideological factors,then it is all the more important to develop a true understanding ofdomestic costs of the international use of force. This can be done onlywith firm microfoundations.Of course, it is not entirely fair to criticize a work for what itdoes not do, particularly when it does as much as this one. But, again,the book's subtitle does advertise "domesticimperatives," so readers will be disappointed when these are notentirely delivered. This lack of microfoundations is all the moredisappointing because the authors' previous works have shown thereto be an important connection between war and the probability that agovernment will remain in office.(4) The search for a plausible set of"microfoundations of war" must continue.War and Reason is an important book. It is a solid piece of socialscience analysis, a true contribution to what is probably the mostrigorous and careful literature in the study of international relations.In it, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman have systematically derived so manytestable predictions that students of international security will bereferring to it for years to come. In sum, the book is important notbecause it is the last word on the causes of war, but because it is thefirst word in what will undoubtedly be a long and fruitful discourse onthe causes of international conflict. (1) Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, TheWar Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981) and "The WarTrap Revisited," American Political Science Review, 79 (March 1985)pp. 156-77. (2) Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory (New York New York, state, United StatesNew York,Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of :Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press (known colloquially as CUP) is a publisher given a Royal Charter by Henry VIII in 1534, and one of the two privileged presses (the other being Oxford University Press). , 1990) and Ariel Rubinstein, "PerfectEquilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, 50 (1982) pp.97-109. (3) See, for instance, Wolfgang Mayer, "Endogenous TariffFormation," American Economic Review, 74 (December 1984) pp.970-85; Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Protection forSale," mimeo (1992); and Stephen Magee, William Brock and LeslieYoung, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: PoliticalEconomy in General Equilibrium (New York: Cambridge University Press,1989). (4) Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson and Gary Woller,"War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis,"American Political Science Review, 86 (September 1992) pp. 638-46.